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vForeword
When in the early 2000s scholars at the Institute of Higher Education of the Shanghai
Jiao Tong University started compiling data on the research performance of the
world’s universities in order to give guidance about where to send Chinese students,
they certainly did not anticipate the upheaval that the release of their ranking would
provoke in Europe. In the event, the realisation that many of the continent’s higher
education jewels in fact ranked low – or did not rank at all – was a major shock that
forced European governments to confront a reality they had preferred to overlook.
Since its first appearance in 2003, the  ‘Shanghai ranking’ has set in motion a major
re-examination of higher education policies throughout Europe. It has also triggered
reform initiatives aimed at fostering excellence and recognition, illustrating again the
potency of benchmarking.
Europe itself had in fact paved the way for such an external assessment by making
academic degrees more comparable and compatible through the Bologna process,
launched in the late 1990s. While Bologna did not introduce any commitment to
change beyond the mere harmonisation of degrees, it enabled comparative assess-
ment and created the conditions for increased competition through student mobility.
But while comparative indicators are enough to start a discussion, they are not suffi-
cient to conclude it. Why are Europe’s higher education institutions performing so
poorly in the ranking? Is it because their mission statement does not correspond to
the Shanghai criteria? Because they lack resources? Because they are poorly gov-
erned? Because they do not select their students? Because they are too small?
There are many potential explanations for Europe’s inadequate performance, which
in turn point forward to different reform priorities. An important additional issue: the
fact that many (though not all) European countries perform poorly is not in itself a
reason for taking action at the EU level. Education policy remains a national remit and
EU initiatives have so far been limited to promoting students’ mobility and ensuring
comparability of grades through the Bologna process. So whether there is a case for
stronger EU involvement in higher education policy is an open issue that deserves
thorough examination.This report is a contribution to the discussion about the priorities of higher education
policy in Europe. Building on the preliminary findings presented a year ago in their
Bruegel Policy Brief (‘Why Reform Europe’s Universities?’, September 2007), the
authors discuss the reasons behind the disappointing performance of higher
education in Europe and propose priorities for action at national (or sub-national)
and EU level.
All five authors are academic economists, though some of them have also been
involved in university and research management. The reason why they have
addressed higher education reform and set forth an ambitious agenda for it is their
conviction that the upgrading of universities is one of the key levers for improving
Europe’s growth performance. They certainly do not overlook other, less utilitarian
motives, for action. But they conclude from recent research that the major invest-
ment in knowledge which Europe needs to make if it is to thrive in a fast-transform-
ing global context cannot be achieved, or at least cannot yield results, without devel-
oping first-class higher education institutions.
This is a key finding that justifies calling for more comprehensive reforms, a signifi-
cant funding effort and a mix of national and EU initiatives. This is what the authors
of this report do in the ambitious, yet practical, agenda they propose. The temptation,
obviously, will be to pick and choose the easier-to- implement components within
their list of proposals. This may certainly help, but it is worth recalling the significant
complementarities between governance and funding pointed out in the report. In the
same way, national and EU initiatives can and must be mutually reinforcing. There is
thus a strong case for designing and implementing a comprehensive package, as pro-
posed in the report. 
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Director, Bruegel
Brussels, June 2008
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viiExecutive summary
European growth has been disappointing for the past 30 years, remaining
persistently lower than in the United States. There is now much evidence that this
situation is closely linked to the state of innovation and higher education in Europe. 
This Bruegel Blueprint has three main goals:
• To analyse differences in higher education systems across Europe and the US;
• To identify the factors behind the differences in university performance across
Europe;
• To suggest reforms in national and EU policies designed to improve the
performance of European universities.
This Blueprint puts forward three findings and three recommendations. 
The three findings are that:
• The level of student mobility in Europe is low and the Bologna process, designed to
create a European Space of Higher Education, will result in quality convergence of
undergraduate education more than in a substantial increase in mobility across
countries;
• More generalist and flexible undergraduate curricula are better at ‘matching’
institutions with students and may thus contribute to reducing the failure rates at
undergraduate level;
• The research performance of Europe’s universities still lags far behind that of their
US counterparts, particularly in the top 50 universities in the so-called ‘Shanghai
ranking’, thus selection at entry should become the norm, specialisation and
therefore mobility should be encouraged, and fees are easier to justify if support-
ed by scholarships, income-contingent loans, and teaching assistantships.  
We recommend that the performance of Europe’s universities can and should be
improved by:• Increasing the funding for universities: it would make sense gradually to raise
annual expenditure on higher education by one percent of European Union GDP
over the next ten years;
• Increasing university autonomy: autonomy and funding are mutually reinforcing
factors;
• Increasing mobility and competition: the EU level should foster mobility for stu-
dents and faculty and promote the development of autonomous and competitive
graduate schools.
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21. Introduction
European growth has been disappointing for the past 30 years, remaining
persistently lower than in the United States. There is now much evidence that this
situation is closely linked to the state of innovation and higher education in Europe
(see Sapir et al.2004, and Aghion et al.2007), which also triggered the launch of the
EU’s Lisbon agenda. 
That higher education has become increasingly important for growth in Europe can
be understood in light of recent work on appropriate institutions and economic
growth (see Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti, 2006). Productivity growth can be
generated either by imitation or by frontier innovation, with innovation becoming
increasingly important for growth as countries get closer to the world technology
frontier. Imitation and frontier innovation each require different institutions and
policies. Thus, while investment in primary and secondary education is more likely to
make a difference for a country's ability to implement existing technologies, higher
(particularly graduate) education investment has a bigger effect on a country's
ability to make leading-edge innovations. Therefore, it is not only the total investment
in education, but also its allocation between different levels of education, that impact
on a country’s growth depending on its stage of development. This intuition has been
confirmed statistically in a study for 22 OECD countries over the period 1960-2000,
which indicates that the impact of higher education on growth increases when
countries approach the technological frontier (see Vandenbussche, Aghion and
Meghir, 2007). 
Thus, as Europe moves closer to the world technological frontier, it needs to rely
increasingly on innovation as the main engine of growth, and therefore to invest
more in higher education. Yet the investment gap in higher education between
Europe and the United States is considerable. In 2005, the proportion of the total pop-
ulation with higher education amounted to 39 percent in the US compared to only 24
percent in the EU, although the gap is narrower for the younger population. This edu-
cational attainment gap is mirrored by a gap in expenditure, with the US devoting 3.3
percent of its GDP to higher education versus only 1.3 percent in the EU. The upshotEUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESINTRODUCTION
is a significant difference between European and American universities in terms of
research performance.  
This Bruegel Blueprint has three main goals. The first is to analyse differences in
higher education systems across Europe and the Atlantic. The second is to identify
the factors which explain differences in university performance across Europe. The
final goal is to suggest reforms in national and EU policies designed to improve the
performance of European universities
1.
Main findings and recommendations
The level of student mobility in Europe is and will remain low at the undergraduate
level. The Bologna process, which aims to create a European Space of Higher
Education, will result more in convergence of undergraduate education in terms of
quality than in a substantial increase in mobility across countries.
In view of this low mobility, the different systems of access to higher education that
currently co-exist across Europe will remain viable. The three systems are: (i) a
numerus clausus at the national level; (ii) selection by the universities themselves;
(iii) unrestricted access with subsequent selection, typically after the first year of
studies. We discuss the pros and cons of all three procedures, linking the discussion
to the issue of fees. Overall, we conclude that systems of free access with selection
after the first year or of selection prior to entry are both functional as matching
procedures. In either case, our preference is for moving towards more generalist and
flexible undergraduate curricula whereby students can wait one or two years before
they specialise. This in turn should contribute to reducing the failure rates at under-
graduate level, as measured for example by the share of undergraduate students that
become durably unemployed.
Our main finding is that, although Europe has recently made great progress in the
production of graduate degrees, the research performance of its universities still lags
far behind that of their American counterparts. This is particularly true when we
restrict attention to the top 50 universities (in the Shanghai ranking). However, as we
move from the top 50 to the top 500, we see European performance becoming
increasingly comparable to the US. In other words, US universities dominate
European universities in the top tier (top 50 and top 100) but Europe has many good
1. For other papers formulating suggestions about reforms of the higher education system, see, for instance,
Lambert and Butler, 2006, or Mas-Colell, 2004a, 2004b.
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universities in the second (top 200) and third tier (top 300 and beyond). It is also
interesting to note that some countries do much better than others: the Nordic
countries, Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and the UK are doing relatively
well, while southern and eastern Europe lag behind.
In contrast to the undergraduate level of education where mobility and student fees
are not essential, and where free access at entry can work well if accompanied by
suitable selection ex post, once we move to graduate education, then: (i) selection at
entry should become the norm; (ii) specialisation and therefore mobility should be
encouraged; (iii) the introduction of fees is easier to justify, supported by scholar-
ships, income-contingent loans, and teaching assistantships.  
How can one improve the performance of European universities? 
• First, by increasing funding. Countries with better performing universities (in terms
of the Shanghai ranking) devote a higher fraction of their GDP to higher education.
Similarly, better performing universities have higher budgets per student. The
EU25 spends on average €8,700 per student versus €36,500 in the US. And within
Europe, Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK are countries with well-
funded universities, whereas southern Europe has particularly large but poorly
funded universities. To give a rough target – which would only close half the gap
between the EU and the US – it would make sense gradually to raise annual expen-
diture on higher education by one percent of European GDP over the next ten
years
2. Regardless of whether this increase is financed publicly or privately
(through fees, private donations and the setting up of endowments), it should go
hand-in-hand with fostering equality of opportunity in terms of university access.
• Second, by increasing university autonomy. Universities in high-performing
countries typically enjoy some degree of autonomy, whether in hiring or in wage-
setting. On the other hand, universities in southern Europe, for example, enjoy
much less autonomy. In Aghion et al. (2007) we showed that the research
performance of European universities, as measured by their Shanghai ranking, is
positively correlated with their budget per student. We also found that the level of
budgetary autonomy and research are positively correlated. Moreover, we found
that autonomy and funding are mutually reinforcing factors: more funding has a
bigger effect on performance in more autonomous universities. This finding mir-
rors results for the United States which show that the effect of additional spending
2. A similar target was already proposed by the European Commission (2006a).EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESINTRODUCTION
on patenting is higher in states with more autonomous universities (see also
Aghion et al. 2005). In this Blueprint, we stress that advocating autonomy is not
tantamount to endorsing ‘self-government’. In fact, we argue that significant exter-
nal influence in university boards, as is the case in successful countries like the
Nordics, Ireland, the UK and especially the Netherlands, is desirable.
• Third, by increasing mobility and competition. This will ensure that increasing
money and autonomy will come with better accountability. Here, the European
Union can help, by fostering mobility for students and faculty. In order to ‘connect
Lisbon to Bologna’, the Union could also strengthen support for starting
researchers, by promoting the development of autonomous and competitive grad-
uate schools, which are an essential part of  the US success in research-oriented
higher education.
Our findings and recommendations are detailed in the remainder of this Blueprint.
62. A European space of higher
education
2.1 Introduction
The European higher education landscape is currently undergoing important changes
that result from the so-called Bologna process and related efforts to create a
European Space of Higher Education (ESHE), where academic degrees and quality
standards would be more comparable and compatible throughout Europe. The
process started with the Sorbonne Declaration signed by the education ministers of
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom in 1998
3, although it had roots in the
Erasmus Programme introduced a decade earlier by the European Commission to
foster student and faculty mobility
4.
By breaking down some of the barriers to mobility across institutions in different
countries, the Bologna process holds the promise of being a decisive step towards a
new dynamic in Europe. A dynamic that propels higher education by bottom-up
forces of imitation and innovation, rather than by top-down initiatives that impose
uniformity. 
The Bologna process structures higher education in three cycles: Bachelor, Master
and Doctorate (or PhD). The Bachelor degree is obtained at the end of the undergrad-
uate level, whereas the Master and the Doctorate require graduate level studies.
The Bologna process has mostly focused on undergraduate education. It has devoted
a lot of effort to defining education and evaluation standards for the Bachelor. By
3. The complete text of the Sorbonne Declaration can be found on the website of the Berlin Summit in 2003:
http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/pdf/Sorbonne_declaration.pdf.
4. See European Commission, Eurydice, 2007 and 2007b, or the European Commission website
http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/educ/higher/higher_en.html for background and a description of its cur-
rent state of development. Also, Haug, 2006.EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESA EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION SPACE
contrast, the attention devoted to graduate education in general, and to Doctoral
studies in particular, has been much more limited. This is problematic because grad-
uate education is precisely where Bologna meets Lisbon, where education meets
research and innovation. Weakness in this link can be a serious handicap for the
European knowledge economy.  
Considerations of practicality account for Bologna’s (partial) neglect of graduate
education. But there are deeper reasons as well, which reflect an implicit fundamen-
tal distinction between the undergraduate and graduate levels of higher education. 
We will argue that this distinction is in fact desirable, as it delineates a good compro-
mise between prudence and innovation in European higher education policy, thus
providing an opportunity for the development of a pragmatic policy approach that
may command sufficient social and political support on the part of the citizens of
Europe to become a reality.  
In our view, the regulation of the undergraduate level should pay special attention to
accessibility, to levelling the playing field and to fairness issues. The main emphasis
should be on maintaining and deepening one of the distinctive positive features of
European higher education: the fact that it produces Bachelor degrees with an aver-
age quality which appears to be reasonable (even if this statement should be quali-
fied by the lack of good data on the subject). Europe should aspire to improve this
average level further, to reduce the gap in standards and to guarantee sensible
minimum performance levels. 
By contrast, at the graduate level (Master and PhD) higher education institutions
should be less regulated and freer to formulate their own conditions of access and
curricula. It is at this level that the ESHE may develop most vigorously, that mobility
may have most of its impact in fostering competition and that, if the process is aided
by good policies, the peaks of European higher education, and research, may emerge. 
This paper, therefore, mostly focuses on graduate education, since this is the area
that has received least attention from Bologna and to which Europe needs to devote
more effort for the sake of innovation and competitiveness. 
We begin, however, by examining the landscape of European undergraduate
education.
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2.2 The Undergraduate Level
This section is organised in four parts: we first consider the students who arrive at the
doors of universities (the ‘demand side’ of degrees), next we examine the
universities (the ‘suppliers’ of degrees), we then proceed to match students and
institutions (the ‘matching’ mechanisms), and conclude with some considerations
about the undergraduate curricula.
2.2.1 Students: from compulsory education to the threshold of higher education
Everywhere in Europe, the minimum requirement for accessing undergraduate
education is an upper secondary qualification. It is important, therefore, to start by
examining the percentage of the population that has successfully completed an
upper secondary education.
Figure 1 shows that the share of the European population eligible for undergraduate
education has risen in most countries and is now around 80 percent, which is still a
little less than in the United States, although the gap is closing. Nonetheless, there
are differences across individual countries.    
As for the proportion of the total population that has successfully completed higher
education in Europe, the figure is only 24 percent, compared to 39 percent in the
United States
5. However, we can see in Figure 2 that the gap is narrowing as the trend
in Europe has also been towards an increase here. For the population aged 25-34 in
2005, the proportion of those with a higher education qualification reached 30 per-
cent on average in Europe and 40 percent in the United States. 
Europe should probably contemplate and promote an increase in the percentage of
young people of a given age that attain a university, or other higher, degree. It should
evolve, in this respect, in the same direction as the US. An objective of at least 40 per-
cent is reasonable. This development should be gradual, but not too slow.
Increasing the share of the population with higher education is important both on
efficiency and equity grounds. The high-productivity knowledge economy requires
higher education. Equity considerations point in the same direction. The right to
access higher education should be viewed as a basic right of what constitutes
European civilisation. To guarantee that no one with the will is left out of higher
5. Source: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2007.education should be a central object of policy
6.
Figure 1: population that has attained at least upper secondary education (2005),
percentage, by age group
Source: OECD
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6. See Usher and Cervenan, 2005, for an international survey on the accessibility issue.
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Figure 2: population that has attained at least tertiary education (2005),
percentage, by age group
Source: OECD
2.2.2 Higher education institutions
With around 4,000 institutions involved, the reality of higher education in Europe is
necessarily diverse. In particular, the boundary between universities and other
higher institutions varies significantly across countries. 
There is horizontal and vertical differentiation across institutions. Horizontal differen-
tiation covers differences in characteristics such as location or curriculum. Vertical
differentiation essentially means differences in ‘quality’, which in turn reflects a mix
of many components, such as quality of the faculty, quality of the students, quality of
research and richness of interaction with the environment. 
An important question is whether the degree of differentiation, especially vertical, is opti-
mal, in some appropriate sense. This is, obviously, a very complex issue, which goes
beyond the scope of this Blueprint. Suffice it say that, in practice, the degree of differenti-
ation is neither fully exogenously determined by public authorities nor fully endogenous-
ly driven by market forces. One aspect that is bound to be relevant is the procedure for
matching demand and supply, namely students and institutions, to which we now turn.
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EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESA EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION SPACE2.2.3 The matching of students to institutions
Fiscal jurisdictions and the geographical perimeter of mobility
Institutions of higher education in Europe are driven by public funding. Yet there is
not one single fiscal jurisdiction. Each state (or, in some cases, sub-state entities)
funds its own higher education system. 
Within the EU, states may not exclude students from other fiscal jurisdictions. And,
indeed, there is some, albeit modest, degree of mobility of students across EU
countries (see Figure 3), which goes some way towards preventing the European
Space of Higher Education from being simply a juxtaposition of isolated national (or
sub-national) systems. 
In theory, the lack of concordance between the fiscal jurisdiction (typically the
nation state, at times the regions) and the space of permissible mobility of students
(the European Union) risks generating problems of the free riding or fiscal competi-
tion-type. So far, however, these problems have been small at the undergraduate level
because, especially if we exclude short-term, Erasmus-like exchanges, mobility at
this level remains very limited in Europe
7.
In fact, the low level of mobility at undergraduate level should not be viewed as an
anomaly. Even in the United States, mobility of undergraduate students is relatively
low. 
Limited mobility is likely to persist even after the Bologna process is fully implement-
ed. For one thing, countrywide specialisation in undergraduate curricula is not likely
to emerge, since there is no prospect of increasing returns to encourage it. On the
other hand, Bologna could in principle result in an increase in student mobility across
countries if it induces an increase in qualitative differences. However, a more likely
scenario is that the creation of the ESHE will result in convergence of the quality of
undergraduate education among countries. In a more transparent landscape, where
good practice and performance become more visible, public opinion is more likely to
demand better public policy.
7. There have been highly-publicised specific exceptions linked to the limitation of access to some degrees (eg in
medicine and related fields) in some countries (namely, France and Germany), with students then flocking to
countries without such limitation (namely, Belgium and Austria). For an analysis of this issue, see Gérard
(2007).
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Figure 3: European students that study a tertiary programme in a European
country other than their home country
Source: Eurostat 2005
Selection procedures
In most European countries, selection procedures are used to limit the number of
admissions to higher education, or to assure institutions that candidates have the
qualifications they deem necessary. 
Three kinds of selection procedure prevail
8:
•A   numerus clausus set at the national level. Here the government limits the
number of places available and exercises direct control over the selection proce-
dure, which is usually anonymous. This numerus clausus typically applies to all
degrees. 
• Selection by the institutions themselves. This is the opposite of the previous
system. There is no central procedure. Institutions are free to set their own limit on
the number of places available and to apply their own procedures for selecting stu-
dents. However, there may be centrally determined criteria for setting limits in the
case of some categories of student. 
• Access is totally unrestricted, except for certain degrees (such as medicine or
engineering). The general rule is that institutions accept all applicants with an
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EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESA EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION SPACEupper secondary qualification. However, a numerus clausus may be set at the
national level or institutions may set their own limits in a small number of specific
fields. 
We asked European universities in the 2006 Top 500 Shanghai ranking to respond to
a questionnaire which included items on student selection at the Bachelor and
Master levels
9. Table 1 provides country averages for selection procedures at these
levels. It indicates a great deal of heterogeneity between countries at the Bachelor
level:
• Access is generally unrestricted in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands as well as in
Switzerland.
• A system of centralised selection prevails in Denmark, Ireland, Spain and Sweden.
• Decentralised selection applies in Germany and the United Kingdom.        
By contrast there is much less heterogeneity at the Master level: almost all countries
have selection procedures, with the selection being decentralised at the level of indi-
vidual institutions.
Table 1: Selection of students by the universities in the sample (averages)
9. For details on our survey, see section IV.
Country Bachelor level Master level
Selection
(1=yes, 0=no)
Centralised
System
(1=yes, 0=no)
Selection
(1=yes, 0=no)
Centralised
System
(1=yes, 0=no)
Belgium 0.1 0.2 0.1 0
Denmark 0.6 0.8 1 0
Germany 0.7 0.2 1 0
Ireland 1 1 1 0
Italy 0.2 0.2 0.8 0
Netherlands 0.3 0.8 1 0
Spain 1 0.8 0.7 0
Sweden 1 0.6 1 0.4
Switzerland 0.4 0.2 0.4 0
UK 1 0.1 0.9 0
Total 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.1
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESA EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION SPACE
1415
Evaluating selection procedures
Selection procedures can be evaluated from several perspectives.  Broadly speaking
they can be grouped according to two overarching criteria: equity vis-à-vis students,
and efficiency from the standpoint of society
10.
The free access model is good from the standpoint of the equity criterion, since it
gives every student an opportunity to prove him/herself. However, it is quite unat-
tractive from the standpoint of efficiency. Therefore most countries implement a vari-
ant of the model which could be called ‘free access with selection in the first year’.
Here the obligation for the institution to accommodate all students is only valid for a
limited period. Conditional on performance, enrolment may continue or not. 
The free access model with selection in the first year has clear advantages and dis-
advantages. On the one hand, it provides maximum opportunity to students and,
assuming the model works properly, a powerful screening process. On the other
hand, it is costly: the resources devoted to an entire year of screening, although even
non-selected students presumably accumulate some human capital. In the end, it is
up to the policy authorities, and to society in general, to ascribe relative weights to
these costs and benefits and to reach a conclusion about the advisability of this
model.  
At any rate, if the selection year is the policy adopted then it is most desirable that
this be stated clearly and in a formalised way rather than operating it in a de facto
manner and perhaps even denying that it is the practice. Clarity in this matter is very
important so that the prospective student may formulate reasonable expectations.  
The other two procedures, with selection prior to entry and executed either centrally
or by the institutions themselves, contrast with the previous model. Leaving aside
the matter of fees, it seems evident that selection is not as satisfactory from the
equity point of view as free access because, at best, it makes fairness a collateral
product of competition. Certainly, competition may push institutions to bid for the
more talented students, but then it may not. Various forms of distortion may frustrate
the proper working of this system (eg favouritism).
From the point of view of providing quality-enhancing signals and incentives the
10.For an account of extensive literature on these matters see Roth and Sotomayor (1992), Roth (2002),
Abdulkadiroglu-Sönmez (2003).
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one condition is satisfied: funding, from whatever source, must be available for all
selected students. If so, the system may work well, not only in terms of both equity
and efficiency. However, concern for equity, in particular avoidance of the type of dis-
tortion alluded to in the previous paragraph, would tend to favour the centralised,
anonymous, selection procedure over the decentralised option. 
The last point makes it clear that the issue of selection procedures cannot be sepa-
rated from the issue of fees (and loans) as far as both equity and efficiency are con-
cerned.
Our survey indicates that student fees vary a great deal across countries, although in
one case there are also differences across universities within a given country. Among
the countries in our sample, three situations prevail:
• There are no fees in the Nordic countries (Denmark and Sweden). There are also no
fees in many German universities, although quite a few have fees of €1,000.
• Fees are high in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland and the United Kingdom):
around €4,000.
• In the other countries, average fees range between around €750 (Belgium, Spain
and Switzerland) and around €1,800 (Netherlands), with Italy in the middle of the
range.   
This suggests that countries which select prior to entry fall into three categories:
• Selection and no fees: the selection in those countries is usually centralised
(Denmark and Sweden), although it is decentralised in German universities. 
• Selection and high fees: two different models prevail among those countries:
centralised selection in Ireland, but decentralised selection in the United Kingdom.
• Selection and moderate fees: two models prevail here as well: centralised selec-
tion in Spain and decentralised selection in German universities.
In other words there is double selection in Anglo-Saxon countries: academic and
financial selection
11. By contrast, there is only academic selection in the Nordic
countries.
On the other hand, in countries where there is no selection prior to entry (but with a
11.Obviously the severity of financial selection depends on the availability and level of student aid.
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selection year policy), fees tend to be neither very low (zero) nor very high. This is
the situation that prevails in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland. These
countries, therefore, practice only moderate selection, both academically and
financially.  
Summing up
Undergraduate education currently entails little mobility between European
countries. In all likelihood this will continue to be the case in spite of the Bologna
process. Geographical proximity to home will remain a consideration of paramount
significance for most students having to choose a higher education institution at
undergraduate level. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that systems of free
access with selection in the first year or of selection prior to entry can both work sat-
isfactorily as matching procedures, even if implemented in national (or sub-national)
fiscal jurisdictions.  
2.2.4 The undergraduate curricula and evaluation: towards a more generalist and
flexible approach
This is, of course, a central topic but we will deal with it only briefly as the pedagogi-
cal issues are well covered by the ongoing Bologna process. 
There is a point worth making here, because it relates at least partly to graduate stud-
ies, which are our main focus. Ideally, undergraduate curricula in Europe should
become more generalist and more flexible. The obligation to commit to a future
degree in a particular field while still a teenager is not the best feature of current
European higher education systems. It is bound to be a source of inefficiency and a
major cause of academic failure. Indeed, we believe that the undergraduate level
would fulfil its matching mission better if students had the possibility to delay spe-
cialisation until after the first or second year. For example, only 30 percent of under-
graduate students in the US end up specialising in the field which they initially chose
upon entering the college or university. Shifting the timing of specialisation from
undergraduate to graduate studies is on the agenda of the Bologna process. It will not
be easy to implement, but it would be unfortunate if nothing came of it.
2.3 The graduate level
An important yardstick for the success of the Bologna process is its capacity to steer
the development of a Europe-wide area of mobility driven by competition, innovation
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESA EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION SPACEand imitation among institutions. As we have argued in the previous section, the
extent of this phenomenon is likely to be limited at the undergraduate level, but that
this is not in itself alarming.  Yet it would be a very significant failure if it did not mate-
rialise at the graduate level.
The central role of the second level of higher education, the Master level, is a major
trait of the Bologna process. It has some parallels in the US system of professional
schools (law, medicine, business, etc.), but no exact analogue that is as comprehen-
sive. It thus provides an opportunity to develop something characteristically
European. It seems clear that the typology of Masters will span a wide range with, at
one end of the spectrum, strictly professional, practice-oriented degrees, perhaps
offered in association with enterprises and, at the other end, research-oriented
degrees which open the way to a PhD. But the field is evolving and many intermedi-
ate cases will emerge. It is still too early for a final model to have crystallised. This is
a domain where a bottom-up approach is the appropriate strategy: experimentation
and institutional risk-taking are fully justified and should be encouraged.  
The student access policies discussed for the Bachelor level should now be qualified
in two ways for the Master level. 
First, Master degrees typically represent a commitment of student time of one or two
academic years
12. It would not make much sense to devote a substantial fraction of
this time to selection.  Therefore the matching system which leaves the selection of
admitted students to the institutions themselves will now come into its own. Since
we are contemplating the emergence of fierce competition, this should not have a
negative impact on efficiency, rather the contrary. It should be added, however, that
the matching task would be much aided by the development of Europe-wide stan-
dardised voluntary tests. 
Second, while the principle of the right of access should be strictly maintained and
actively promoted, the argument in favour of fees embodying a substantial subsidy
is now somewhat weaker. A policy of scholarships and of income-contingent loans
may suffice for guaranteeing the equity objectives. The specific policy may, of
course, depend on the nature of the Master. A research Master leading to a Doctoral
degree should not be treated in the same way as a professional Master commanding
a more immediate market return. For example, the University of California at
12.Both lengths are currently present, even within the same country, and the expectation is that they will continue
to coexist.
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Berkeley, one of the elite American public universities, charges fees for professional
Masters (for the academic year 2007-08) ranging from  $13,861 for Public Health or
Public Policy to $27,000 for Law or  Business (these are residents’ fees, for non-
residents the amount increases by a factor of 1.5 to 2). For research Masters the
equivalent fee is $9,577.  
This point can only be reinforced by observing that, if successful, the Master studies
should attract students from outside Europe, some talented and with limited means
(and therefore arguably deserving of scholarship help), some less so. It is not self-
evident that the cost of their education should be sustained by European taxpayers.
At any rate, as for the undergraduate level, different countries may have different
policies. It is clear, however, that in a context of increased mobility, conceivable at the
Master level, the harmonisation issue will come more to the fore.
For the third cycle, Doctoral studies, the principle of selection by the institution is
already well established, and there is no reason to modify it. Note also that PhD train-
ing, to be effective, should be based on fellowships, or teaching assistantships. There
is no significant room for fees or for loans here.
In contrast with undergraduate education, specialisation, and therefore student
mobility, should be encouraged at the graduate level. Offering focused Master
degrees of high quality and capable of attracting students beyond the immediate
catchment area may be a successful strategy in the new context.
Competition will, undoubtedly, also induce vertical differentiation in graduate stud-
ies. This is as it should be. The optimal degree of vertical differentiation is probably
higher at this level than for undergraduate studies. Europe needs elite institutions
providing excellent training for excellent graduate students. A programme designed
to ensure that every university be excellent at the graduate level would be, in eco-
nomic terms, a non-starter. Any attempt to implement such a programme would be
tantamount to preventing the emergence of excellence.  
The mission of graduate studies is to create a link between education, research and
innovation. The more advanced professional Masters provide high-skilled human
resources to technology-based enterprises, while research Masters and Doctorates
provide the resources needed by universities and (public and private) research
centres. 
Graduate education, and particularly but not only the Doctoral (and pre-Doctoral
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESA EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION SPACEresearch Master) level is where the European Space of Higher Education and the
European Research Area – ie Bologna and Lisbon – meet. We believe that the time
has come to make the development of graduate studies a central focus for policy in
Europe. Much as we think that competition will help, it will not be sufficient
13.
To be sure, Europe has recently made great progress in the production of graduate
degrees, including at the Doctoral level. For instance, a recent report by the US
National Science Foundation indicates that in 2003 EU15 produced more science
and engineering Doctorates than the United States, both in absolute and in relative
terms (compared to total population)
14. Although this partly reflects stagnation in the
United States, it also results from a significant increase on this side of the Atlantic.
This situation is by no means limited to science and engineering. Thus in 2005, EU27
produced 96,000 Doctorates (20 per 100,000 inhabitants) in all fields against
53,000 (18 per 100,000 inhabitants) in the United States
15.
However, as we will show in the next section, European universities still lag far behind
their American counterparts in terms of research excellence.  
What are the policies needed to foster graduate studies in Europe? One is money.
There is a very basic fact which is often not fully appreciated in Europe: quality grad-
uate education is very costly. Hence a sizeable increase in resources will need to be
mobilised at this level. But money alone is not enough. The promotion of graduate
studies also requires organisational changes
16.
Universities should not aspire to organisational homogeneity across different tasks.
The needs of undergraduate education, graduate training, research, technology
transfer, impact on local development etc. are simply not comparable. The appropri-
ate development of all its functions requires decentralisation and institutional cre-
ativity. In this respect, we believe there is a type of institution which may be partic-
ularly suitable and valuable in the development of the ESHE and which universities
could usefully promote: graduate schools. We view these schools as satisfying a
13.The European Commission has taken an active position in this matter, see for example European Commission,
2003. See also Van der Ploeg and Veugelers, 2007.
14.In 2003, the number of science and engineering Doctorates produced by EU15 was 42,000 compared to 27,000
for the United States. The respective populations aged 18-23 were 28 and 24 million. See National Science
Foundation, Asia’s Rising Science and Technology Strength, Comparative Indicators for Asia, the European Union,
and the United States, Washington, D.C, May 2007.
15.The data for the EU are from Eurostat. Those for the US from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).
16.General introductions to Doctoral education in Europe are included in European University Association, 2007, or
Sadlak, 2004.  See also LERU, 2007a, 2007b.
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clear need and, without attempting to postulate a norm, as requiring (at least many
of them) the following characteristics:
(i) They should be institutionally strong and their leaders should be free to act on
their own initiative and react to competition, that is, they should be reasonably
autonomous and display good governance. 
(ii) While they may or may not have their own legal status, graduate schools
should have a budget. In some cases it may be for hiring permanent faculty.
However this is unlikely to be the most frequent scenario since typically graduate
schools would borrow their core faculty from their host universities. The strength
of graduate schools will, therefore, crucially depend on the strength of their host
institutions.
(iii) More frequently, the budget of graduate schools would be used for financing
temporary faculty appointments (including post-Docs) and, most important of all,
for student fellowships and scholarships. 
(iv) We believe that it is intellectually indispensable that they should have volume
and critical mass. This has, at least, two implications: 
– The defining theme should not be too narrow, and certainly not sub-
disciplinary. 
– Graduate schools may constitute a primary basis for collaboration between
(nearby) universities. Experience of this type already exists (for example, eco-
nomics in Holland or Belgium, or physics in Scotland).
We confess that graduate schools is an idea that comes from the US. Indeed, they are
the jewels in the crown of US research-oriented universities. Europeans should not be
self-conscious about this instance of ‘imitation’. By developing graduate schools we
would only be bringing back home a European institution. It is well known that the
American Graduate School is nothing but the model of the Humboldian university,
imported to the US by American scholars training in Germany at the end of the nine-
teenth century, and then grafted and superimposed onto the liberal arts education
campuses of the traditional American universities
17 (the first example was Johns
Hopkins University, founded in 1876). The global, and very positive, phenomenon of
17.Explained by Matthias Doepke in the conference ‘New Generation-New Approach, Germany and US in an Age of
Global History’. For  other background references, see Nybom, 2003, or  W.Clark, 2006.
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESA EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION SPACEthe generalisation of university education witnessed over the last 40 years gave an
abrupt shock to the Humboldian model in Europe, the reverberations of which are
driving the current need for reform. But it was not a major disturbance in the US: the
brunt of the generalisation of university education was absorbed, very well, by its lib-
eral arts component. Europe now has an opportunity to bring Humboldt back, and the
formula to do so may be the graduate schools. 
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European universities
Europe is faced with a challenge in the research field. The Lisbon agenda formulates
a programme for the development of a high-productivity (‘knowledge-based’) econo-
my which is second-to-none, that is, an economy at the productivity frontier (see
Sapir et al. 2004). It follows from this approach that Europe requires a research
system which is cutting-edge and second-to-none. Europe has a good research
system but it does not lead the world. It is a solid second (see Pavitt, 2001, Dosi,
Llerena, Sylos-Labini, 2006, Bauwens, Mion and Thisse, 2007). In a sense the Lisbon
objective of achieving an economy which is second-to-none applies also to research
itself. 
Universities constitute a main locus for research activities, especially for the more
curiosity-driven, basic aspects. In fact, it can be argued (as some of us have, see
Aghion, Dewatripont, Stein, 2006) that the organisational model of a university, with
the high degree of freedom it gives to professors and other teaching staff, provides an
optimal environment for the development of basic, frontier research. Be that as it
may, 22 percent of European research activity takes place at universities
18.
When discussing the role of universities in research there is a tension which is
difficult to confront but which should not be ignored. Insisting that all universities,
without exception, should have research as a goal helps, no doubt, in maintaining the
average quality of universities (and of the teaching they provide). Yet the ambition
that all may achieve a similar - presumably high - level of research performance is
unrealistic if ‘high’ means ‘very high’. In the US there are 7,018 universities of which
only 1,640 offer Master programmes and 614 Doctoral programmes
19. The cultural
18.Research and development expenditure by sector, Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?
_pageid=1996,39140985&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=detailref&language=en&product=Yearlies
_new_science_technology&root=Yearlies_new_science_technology/I/I1/eca10000.
19.Source: US National Center for Education Statistics.EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESRESEARCH PERFORMANCE
diversity of Europe should ensure a more dispersed map of excellence, but there is no
denying that the high peaks cannot make up a significant proportion of the whole.
And Europe needs these peaks.
The recognition of this fact has been stirred greatly by the publication, since 2003, of
the so-called ‘Shanghai ranking/index’ (more precisely, the ‘Shanghai Jiao Tong
University Academic Ranking of World Universities’), which measures university
research performance across the world. Indeed, this ranking tends to reinforce the
evidence that the US is well ahead of Europe in terms of cutting-edge university
research.
Constructed by a group of Chinese scholars, the Shanghai index is a weighted aver-
age of six different indicators of research performance (see Box 1). While the weight-
ings are admittedly somewhat arbitrary and accord too little importance to social sci-
ences and humanities, the main advantage of the index is its reliance on publicly
available information. In any case, this ranking is now receiving worldwide attention.
Its only rival is the ranking computed annually, since 2004, by the Times Higher
Education Supplement (THES), which follows a somewhat different methodology
(relying to a significant extent on opinions from experts they have selected).  
BOX 1: THE SHANGHAI INDEX
This index aggregates six different indicators:
• The number of alumni from the university winning Nobel Prizes in physics,
chemistry, medicine, and economics and Fields Medals in mathematics (this
makes up 10 percent of the overall index).
• The number of university faculty winning Nobel Prizes in physics, chemistry,
medicine, and economics and Fields Medals in mathematics (20 percent of the
overall index).
• The number of articles (co)authored by university faculty published in Nature
and Science (20 percent of the overall index).
• The number of articles (co)authored by university faculty published in Science
Citation Index Expanded and Social Sciences Citation Index (20 percent of the
overall index).
• The number of highly cited researchers from the university in 21 broad subject
categories (20 percent of the overall index).
• The academic performance with respect to the size of the university (10 per-
cent of the index).
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Note that the Shanghai index tends to undervalue countries where a great deal of aca-
demic scientific research takes place outside universities (the Max Planck Institutes
in Germany) or in organisations whose researchers are affiliated to several
universities (the CNRS laboratories in France). This partly explains the poor
performance of France and Germany in Table 2. 
In our Policy Brief (Aghion et al. 2007), we discuss the research performance of EU
countries and its determinants. Table 2 (overleaf) presents a detailed account of rel-
ative country performance, looking successively at the Top 50, Top 100, Top 200 and
Top 500 universities in the Shanghai ranking. To understand how to read this table,
consider first the column ‘Top 50’. The best university in the Top 50 is given a score of
50, the next best university is given the score 49, and so on down to a score of 1 for
the lowest performing university within the Top 50. For each country (or region), we
then compute the sum of Top 50 Shanghai rankings that belong to this country, and
divide the sum by the country's population. Finally, all the country scores are divid-
ed by the US score, so that each entry in the column ‘Top 50’ can be interpreted as a
fraction of the US per capita performance for the Top 50 universities. This gives our
country performance index for the Top 50 universities. The same logic applies to the
‘Top 100’, ‘Top 200’ and ‘Top 500’ columns, where the best university receives a score
of, respectively, 100, 200 and 500, and the lowest placed always receives a score of
1. There are, obviously, fewer zero entries in a column as one moves from the Top 50
to the Top 500. Table 2: Country performance in the Shanghai ranking (measured as percentages
of the US per capita performance)
Country Population
(millions)
Top 50 Top 100 Top 200 Top 500
Austria 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 52.6
Belgium 10.4 0.0 0.0 61.3 122.4
Czech Republic 10.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.1
Denmark 5.4 0.0 74.6 113.5 160.5
Finland 5.2 0.0 45.5 75.4 80.5
France 60.2 3.0 15.2 28.6 45.1
Germany 82.5 0.0 17.0 36.5 67.0
Greece 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.2
Hungary 10.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.3
Ireland 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0
Italy 57.6 0.0 0.0 11.1 33.9
Netherlands 16.3 20.2 50.7 75.9 131.3
Poland 38.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5
Spain 42.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 14.2
Sweden 9.0 6.7 116.5 178.8 216.9
UK 59.8 72.0 86.1 98.0 123.9
EU15 383.3 12.7 26.0 41.0 67.3
EU25 486.6 10.0 20.5 32.4 53.9
Norway 4.6 0.0 65.8 90.6 107.0
Switzerland 7.4 97.1 165.5 228.1 229.6
Australia 20.1 0.0 31.4 65.8 100.7
Canada 31.9 39.3 54.2 62.9 103.6
Japan 127.7 14.3 17.2 24.3 26.7
US 293.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
California 36.1 234.2 198.5 163.2 103.2
Massachusetts 6.4 448.7 307.8 301.7 263.0
New York 19.3 195.7 167.4 138.7 147.7
Pennsylvania 12.4 110.7 176.9 161.0 115.2
Texas 22.9 32.7 60.9 82.8 102.5
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Again as discussed in our Policy Brief, Table 2 reveals several interesting findings:
• First, the United States completely dominates all European countries in the Top 50
universities. Only Switzerland and the United Kingdom rival the US on a per capita
basis. By contrast, the EU15 and EU25, with a greater population than the US,
score much lower.
• Second, the top 4 US states (Massachusetts, California, New York and
Pennsylvania) score better than any European state in the Top 50 and Top 100.
• Third, country performance converges as one enlarges the number of universities
considered. In particular, the gap between the EU15 or the EU25 and the US nar-
rows as one moves from the Top 50 to the Top 500. In part this is due to the way
the scores are constructed, but it mostly reflects a reality: American universities
dominate European universities in the top tier (the Top 50 and Top 100), but
Europe has many good universities in the second (the next 100) and the third
(the next 300) tiers. 
• Fourth, there are major differences among European countries: Switzerland, the
UK and Sweden do particularly well, even in the Top 100, where they out-perform
(Switzerland and Sweden) or almost match (the UK) the United States on a per
capita basis. Denmark, Finland, Belgium and the Netherlands also perform well in
the Top 200 and Top 500. By contrast, southern and eastern Europe lag far behind.
France and Germany do relatively poorly, except in the third tier, ie the universities
ranked between 301 and 500.
These findings mean that: (i) Europe should improve at the top, given that so much
of the benefits of research come from ‘the frontier’; (ii) various countries should
moreover improve their overall performance. 
How? This question prompted us to look, in our Policy Brief, at the determinants of
research performance, in terms of funding and governance. We turn now to these two
topics, which of course also influence the other missions of universities. 4. The funding of European
universities
To explain the performance of European universities, an obvious starting point for
economists is to look at money. Table 3 presents aggregate data on the levels of pri-
vate and public expenditure on higher education across countries. 
Table 3: Public and private expenditure on higher education in 2001
Source: DG Research; *: not available. Note: not PPP-converted.
In thousands of € per student As a  percent of GDP
Country Public Private Total Public Private Total
Austria 11.0 0.5 11.5 1.4 0.1 1.5
Belgium 10.6 1.6 12.2 1.4 0.2 1.6
Czech Republic 2.3 0.4 2.7 0.8 0.1 0.9
Denmark 25.6 0.4 26.0 2.7 0.0 2.7
Finland 10.3 0.3 10.6 2.1 0.1 2.2
France 7.5 1.2 8.7 1.0 0.2 1.2
Germany 11.5 0.9 12.4 1.1 0.1 1.2
Greece 3.3 0.0 3.3 1.2 0.0 1.2
Hungary 2.6 0.6 3.2 1.1 0.3 1.4
Ireland 9.7 1.6 11.3 1.2 0.2 1.4
Italy 5.6 1.4 7.0 0.8 0.2 1.0
Netherlands 13.0 2.7 15.7 1.3 0.3 1.6
Poland 1.7 -* -* 1.1 -* -*
Spain 4.0 1.2 5.2 1.0 0.3 1.3
Sweden 18.9 1.8 20.7 2.1 0.2 2.3
UK 8.4 3.1 11.5 0.8 0.3 1.1
EU25 7.3 1.4 8.7 1.1 0.2 1.3
US 16.6 19.9 36.5 1.5 1.8 3.3
Japan 6.5 7.3 13.8 0.5 0.6 1.129
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The main findings are that: 
• Richer countries spend relatively more on higher education than poorer countries.
• The US spends a lot more on higher education than any European country, espe-
cially thanks to private funding. But public spending alone is relatively higher than
in the EU.
• The Nordic countries also spend a considerable amount, with most of the money
coming from public sources. 
• The UK spends surprisingly little. 
While there has been much talk in recent years about the ‘research spending deficit’
of Europe relative to the US, which concerns in fact private research spending (see
Sapir et al. 2004, for example), we should in fact speak of the ‘double deficit’, since
there is also a deficit in terms of higher education funding (and, in terms of GDP per
capita, it  again stems mainly from a difference in levels of private funding, though
there is a very substantial difference in public funding, too, in terms of € per student).
Beyond this, the situation within Europe varies significantly. And there is the intrigu-
ing case of the UK, which does very well in the Shanghai ranking, thanks to its top
performers, while its aggregate funding is relatively modest.
This brings us to the observation that these aggregate data do not indicate how the
money is split between higher education institutions, in particular between research-
oriented and teaching-oriented universities. In the remainder of this section we
therefore present the results of our survey questionnaire which elicits information on
individual budgets and on the governance of top research performers.
This survey questionnaire was sent to the European universities in the 2006 Top 500
Shanghai ranking
20. We received 71 responses, an overall response rate of 36 per-
cent, which can be considered very satisfactory. We decided to focus on the ten
countries for which the response rate was at least 25 percent and the number of
respondents at least two
21. This left us with a total sample of 66 universities, with an
average response rate of 41 percent for the ten countries considered. We were able to
20.The 2006 Shanghai ranking includes roughly 200 European universities belonging to EU25 and Switzerland.
21.The ten countries are: Belgium (4 responses out of 7 universities in the Shanghai 500 ranking), Denmark (2 out
of 5), Germany (11 out of 40), Ireland (2 out of 3), Italy (9 out of 23), Netherlands (4 out of 12), Spain (6 out of
9), Sweden (5 out of 11), Switzerland (6 out of 8) and the UK (17 out of 43). We omitted France because only 4
out of 21 universities responded and, moreover, university budgetary data are not comparable with those of other
countries.EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESUNIVERSITY FUNDING
check that, for each country, respondent universities have an average Shanghai 500
rank fairly close to that of the whole population of universities from that country, so
that we could be satisfied of the representativity of our sample
22.
Table 4 provides country averages on the size and financing (per student) of top
European universities
23. It confirms the high degree of heterogeneity between
countries for the universities in the Top 500:
• Southern European countries (Italy and Spain) have very large (more than 40,000
students on average) but not well-funded universities. 
• Sweden and the Netherlands have universities of average size (mostly of the order
of 20-25,000 students), and are better funded. 
• Several other countries have universities of similar size but with lower levels of
funding: Belgium, Denmark, Germany or Ireland.
• UK and Switzerland have small (10-15,000 students) and very well funded
universities. 
One striking observation is thus that, referring to the data on aggregate expenditure
in Table 3, the UK significantly favours top research performers, since the universities
in our sample (which belong to the group of top universities) have a budget per
student which is about double the average for all universities in the country. 
Beyond this, Table 4 clearly shows that in many countries, these universities, which
are the top European research performers, have to work with modest financial
means. Indeed, the previous table showed that, on average, US universities have
much higher budgets per student. And it is well known that the concentration of
money at the top of US research universities (through endowments, private dona-
tions and US-wide research money
24) is much more pronounced than in a largely pub-
licly-funded European university landscape. 
In fact, the low budget per student in many European countries is a symptom of ‘mas-
sification’ without accompanying budgets, and southern Europe is the most extreme
example of this phenomenon: public authorities ask top European research
universities to educate more students (indeed we saw in Section II that Europe has
made progress in this respect) while providing them with comparatively very low
22.In fact, respondents had a somewhat higher rank for all countries except for Spain.
23.We obtain very similar results when looking at medians rather than averages.
24.See Lombardi, Capaldi, Abbey, 2006.
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budgets per student. While there are clear synergies between research and teaching
and it is not necessarily desirable to keep top research universities small in terms of
student numbers, it is clearly unwise to impose upon them many students but a
limited budget.
Table 4: Size and funding of the universities in the sample (averages)
* PPP adjusted
If we turn to budget composition, there are also several interesting facts:
• All countries have a share of public core funding of 60-70 percent, except for the
UK and Ireland.
• This fact is explained in particular by the high proportion of the budget coming
from tuition fees in these latter two countries (23 percent and 32 percent respec-
tively), even if southern European countries also have a non-trivial proportion of
their (relatively low) budgets coming from fees. By contrast, Nordic universities
receive nothing from students, and student fees are symbolic for several other
countries, including Germany and Switzerland. 
• The share of the budget coming from competitive research grants is typically 15-
22 percent, with outliers being Spain (10 percent) and Italy (12 percent), and
Sweden (34 percent).
Number of
students
(thousands)
Budget per
student
(€ 000s)*
% budget
coming from
public core
funding
% budget
coming from
tuition fees
% budget
coming from
competitive
research
grants
% of budget
coming from
other
sources
Belgium 21.7 11.3 65 5 21 9
Denmark 18.2 11.4 70 0 19 2
Germany 26.2 9.6 73 1 22 4
Ireland 16.3 12.7 38 32 18 12
Italy 44.9 10.1 63 12 12 9
Netherlands 21.4 20.5 68 7 15 10
Spain 44.8 7.0 62 16 10 13
Sweden 27.1 16.2 60 0 34 6
Switzerland 12.8 26.2 72 3 18 7
UK 14.6 24.5 35 23 21 20
Total 24.9 16.1 58 11 19 11EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESUNIVERSITY FUNDING
Comparing these facts with the results in terms of research performance indicates
that there are several ‘successful models’ in Europe. One can be successful without
having significant fees, as the Nordic countries and Switzerland indicate, or with fees,
as the UK indicates. Our Policy Brief shows, however, that higher budgets do
significantly help research performance. This means that, if funding does not come
from fees, it must come from other sources, in particular public funds. Universities
cannot rely on very sizeable amounts of money from ‘market-oriented activities’ such
as spin-offs, or from endowments, which in any case take time to build up. While
these sources of income should be encouraged, as a first approximation budgets are
in general determined by fee income and public funding.
There is also the question of how public money is awarded. A detailed discussion of
this important issue is beyond the scope of this paper. But it is worth stressing the
importance of ‘competitive research grants’ in university budgets. Ensuring merito-
cratic distribution of such grants is a key to research success. There has been much
innovation in recent years on this front (eg the UK Research Assessment Exercises,
among others), with a general trend towards stricter evaluation. This is a welcome
development. Let us simply stress three elements:
1. First, in order to raise the efficiency of the research allocation process, it is desir-
able gradually to raise the amount of money distributed as a result of EU-wide
competition, and not just as a result of national or regional competition. 
2. Second, one should bear in mind that universities are ‘multi-task organisations’,
involved in teaching, research and ‘service to society’. As is well known from
incentive theory (eg Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), increasing incentives for
one task can be expected to raise effort devoted to that task but also to divert it
from other tasks. One should therefore ensure a balance in terms of incentives
provided to education systems in general (this does not mean that individuals
cannot ‘self-select’ and focus on specific tasks). This means for example that the
provision by the higher education system of stronger incentives for quality
research should be accompanied by stronger incentives for quality teaching. And
the same is true for the relationship between the university and its faculty:
institutions should bear in mind that incentives should also be provided for ‘ser-
vice to society’ and for managing the organisation, otherwise these two tasks will
be neglected in favour of pursuing scientific publications and/or good student
evaluations
25. 
25.See Dewatripont et al.(2001, 2002) for analyses of these issues.
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3. Finally, one should be aware of the intrinsic imperfections of ‘quality measures’.
For example, it is natural to try to take advantage of bibliometric indicators in
research evaluation. However, just as Table 2 indicated that it is somewhat
arbitrary to make country comparisons based on university rankings, it is also
somewhat arbitrary to compare journals or simply to sum citations. One must take
account of these difficulties and do ‘robustness checks’ of quantitative
comparisons, ideally combined with peer evaluation committees. That said,
citation numbers computed by independent sources have one advantage over
indicators such as numbers of Ph.D’s awarded: they are harder to ‘manipulate’ by
varying the quality of the output.5. The governance of European
universities
All universities in Europe are heavily funded by public authorities. On the other hand,
there is considerable variation in the degree of ‘autonomy’ of universities and other
higher education and research institutions with respect to these public authorities.
We devote this section to analysis and discussion of this crucially important organi-
sational characteristic. We also draw attention to a distinction between the concepts
of ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-government’
26.
5.1 Autonomy and research performance
A university, or any institution, is autonomous if it has legal status and can conclude
contracts, and if its governing bodies (collectively ‘the board’) can determine with a
considerable degree of freedom the policies and practices needed to accomplish its
mission (as laid down in the constitution of the institution). Thus, for example, com-
plete autonomy in our case (higher education institutions) would mean, among other
things, that the university could determine its own curricula, choose fee levels, select
students, select professors and other teaching staff and decide on remuneration
levels (within the limits of its means), establish development plans, etc.
Even in this case of ‘complete autonomy’ some limitations have to be pointed out:
i Obviously, the institution is subject to the law of the land and to the accountability
requirements to which any institution, from the purely private to the public (espe-
cially an educational institution) is subject.
ii Complete autonomy can only really prevail with financial independence. If the
26.Of course, this is an issue where the perspectives of political science, management and other social sciences in
general have much to offer. See for some recent examples Shattock, 2003, 2006, Bonnacorsi, 2007, Capano,
2007, Lazzeretti and Tavoletti, 2006.  For a US economist’s point of view, see Ehrenberg, 1999.35
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university depends – as is the general case in Europe – on public subsidies, it is
inevitable that this will limit its autonomy. 
Even taking the above into account it is clear that there are few universities in Europe
that could be considered, on the above criteria, to be completely autonomous.  
In order to illustrate this, Table 5 (overleaf) presents evidence on the governance of
our sample of universities. As with size and funding, there is also a great deal of het-
erogeneity as far as university governance is concerned:
• State intervention is clearly pervasive, even when universities are not public.
• Wage-setting autonomy is rare, with Sweden and the UK being the foremost
exceptions.
• Ownership of university buildings is commonplace (except in the Nordic countries
and Switzerland).
• Hiring autonomy is prevalent, except in southern Europe. 
A striking fact is the high variation in types of university governance across European
countries, even among those which are performing well in terms of research. For
example, among the three European countries with the best performance index,
wage-setting autonomy exists in Sweden and the UK but not in Switzerland.
Universities are mostly public in Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland, whereas they
are mostly private in the Netherlands and the UK. This does not mean that all the
dimensions of autonomy should not be pursued in parallel in order to improve
performance. It merely suggests that universities in countries with low performance
in rankings, such as France, Italy and Spain, could already improve their situation by
reforming some dimensions of governance.
One dimension where there is little variation across European countries is the age of
universities. Top European universities are old institutions: the average age of the 66
universities in our sample is nearly 300 years. It ranges from 220 years in the
Netherlands to 450 years in Italy. The only outlier is Denmark where the average age
is only 60 years. This suggests that European universities have a lot of accumulated
knowledge, but that they may also be complicated to reform. 
As discussed in our Policy Brief, our survey allows us to examine how budget per
student and various measures of university governance correlate with research
performance measured by the Shanghai ranking. Namely, we show that the research
performance of a university is:EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESGOVERNANCE
A
g
e
 
(
i
n
 
y
e
a
r
s
)
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
t
a
t
u
s
(
1
 
i
f
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
,
 
0
 
i
f
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
)
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
a
u
t
o
n
o
-
m
y
 
 
(
1
 
i
f
 
y
e
s
,
 
0
i
f
 
n
o
)
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
 
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
(
1
 
i
f
y
e
s
,
 
0
 
i
f
 
n
o
)
H
i
r
i
n
g
a
u
t
o
n
o
m
y
(
1
 
i
f
y
e
s
,
 
0
 
i
f
 
n
o
)
W
a
g
e
-
s
e
t
t
i
n
g
a
u
t
o
n
o
m
y
(
1
 
i
f
y
e
s
,
 
0
 
i
f
 
n
o
)
%
 
o
f
 
F
a
c
u
l
t
y
w
i
t
h
 
o
w
n
 
P
h
D
d
e
g
r
e
e
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
b
o
a
r
d
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
2
8
4
0
.
5
0
.
3
7
5
1
.
0
1
.
0
0
.
0
6
3
0
.
8
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
5
9
1
.
0
1
.
0
0
.
2
5
0
.
5
0
.
5
4
0
0
.
4
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
2
8
9
0
.
9
0
.
0
0
.
5
0
.
8
0
.
0
8
0
.
9
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
2
5
9
0
.
5
0
.
5
1
.
0
1
.
0
0
.
0
4
9
0
.
6
I
t
a
l
y
4
4
4
1
.
0
0
.
9
1
.
0
0
.
4
0
.
0
2
4
0
.
9
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
2
1
7
0
.
8
0
.
8
1
.
0
0
.
8
0
.
2
3
3
0
.
1
S
p
a
i
n
3
4
2
1
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
0
.
5
0
.
0
6
9
0
.
8
S
w
e
d
e
n
2
6
6
0
.
8
0
.
8
0
.
2
1
.
0
1
.
0
5
8
0
.
4
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
3
2
6
0
.
8
0
.
1
0
.
4
0
.
8
0
.
0
2
4
0
.
9
U
K
2
4
2
0
.
5
0
.
9
0
.
9
1
.
0
0
.
8
8
0
.
4
T
o
t
a
l
2
9
0
0
.
7
5
0
.
5
5
0
.
7
6
0
.
8
0
.
3
1
2
9
0
.
7
T
a
b
l
e
 
5
:
 
C
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
u
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
(
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
s
)
3637
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESGOVERNANCE
• Positively correlated with the size of its budget per student: the higher the budget
per student, the better the performance;
• Negatively correlated with its degree of public ownership: private universities per-
form better than public institutions;
• Positively correlated with its budget autonomy: not being required to have its
budget approved by governmental authorities is associated with better
performance;
• Not correlated with its building ownership: more autonomy with respect to build-
ings is not associated with better performance;
• Positively correlated with its hiring and wage-setting autonomy : universities that
decide on faculty hiring and set faculty wages do better;
• Negatively correlated with its degree of endogamy in faculty hiring: universities
which tend to hire their own graduates as faculty do less well.
Taken together these results suggest that the research performance of a university is
positively affected by all our measures of university autonomy (except for building
ownership), and also by funding. However, these partial correlations do not tell us: (i)
which of these autonomy indicators dominates and how interrelated they are; (ii)
whether funding and autonomy improve performance separately from one another,
or whether there are positive interactions between the two. 
This can be done using ‘regression analysis’, a statistical technique for the investiga-
tion of relationships between variables, to assess the effect of budget and gover-
nance on research performance measured by Shanghai rankings. We are interested
in the effect of budget and university governance on university research
performance. However, we need to begin by taking into account two other factors that
also affect Shanghai rankings, our measure of university research performance. The
first is the size of the university. As Box 1 clearly indicates, all other things being
equal, larger institutions are likely to have a better Shanghai ranking because they
have more researchers. We do not have data on the number of researchers in our sur-
vey, so we proxy the size of the university by the number of students. The second fac-
tor is the age of the university. Box 1 also indicates that, all other things being equal,
older institutions may have a better Shanghai ranking because they have more alum-
ni.
As expected, the regression analysis indicates that the research performance of
universities is positively associated with their size and their age. More importantly, it
also confirms the existence of a positive linkage between budget per student and
research performance. These effects are statistically significant. 38
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Once these three important factors (size, age and money) are taken into account, it
turns out that one of the autonomy indicators reported in Table 5, namely budget
autonomy, has a statistically significant effect on research performance. The others
have no statistical impact on performance. 
But our main result is not simply that more money or more autonomy is good for
research performance. It is that more money has much more impact when it is com-
bined with budget autonomy. To be more precise: we find that having budget autono-
my doubles the effect of additional money on university research performance.    
Hence, increasing budget per student helps research performance, and having
budget autonomy doubles this beneficial effect. 
5.2 Internal versus external governance
Let us now turn to the issue of who controls universities. Table 5 only presents sum-
mary data on the composition of the board of directors of universities. We are well
aware of the fact that there are many dimensions to the internal control of complex
institutions like universities. However, we found it useful to look at the percentages
of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ members of their boards. By internal members we mean
representatives of faculty, of teaching and research assistants, of students and of
administrative and technical personnel, while by external members we mean repre-
sentatives of alumni and of public authorities, as well as ‘independent outsiders’. We
are thus seeking to capture the extent of ‘self-government’ in universities (knowing
moreover that within a given country there can be heterogeneity, for example when
public and private universities co-exist).
We see that the proportion of internal board members ranges from 0.1 to 0.9. The
Netherlands is the country where outside members have the most power, while at the
other extreme internal members have most power on the board in Belgium, Germany,
Italy, Spain or Switzerland. Finally, we have a more equal relationship between inter-
nal and external members in the Nordic countries, in the UK and in Ireland. 
It is interesting to investigate whether board composition is correlated with
‘endogamy’, measured as the percentage of faculty trained in-house at the PhD level.
In fact, endogamy seems to be negatively correlated with country size: it is relatively
high in small countries (Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Sweden, but not in
Switzerland which is highly open to hiring scholars with PhDs from other39
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESGOVERNANCE
institutions), and low in large countries (Germany, Italy and the UK, but not in Spain).
This finding clearly reflects the absence of significant academic mobility between
European countries. On the other hand, there is no clear relationship between board
composition and endogamy: internal control co-exists with low endogamy in
Germany, Italy and Switzerland, but high endogamy in Belgium and Spain. At the
other extreme, the Netherlands are characterised by external control while being
‘average’ in terms of endogamy. And countries with a more equal relationship
between internal and external members have either high endogamy (Nordic
countries and Ireland) or very low endogamy (UK).
Once again, successful countries differ in terms of board composition. Indeed, the
Netherlands and Switzerland offer an interesting contrast in this respect. That said,
while we should reiterate that board composition is only one indicator of the alloca-
tion of power in organisations, our feeling is that having significant outside represen-
tation on the board may be a necessary condition to ensure that dynamic reforms
taking into account long-term institutional interests can be decided upon without
undue delay.
5.3 Entrepreneurship and intellectual property
Universities are economic forces. They are stores of knowledge and creativity. Part of
their success lies in the multiple spillovers they give rise to, of which entrepreneur-
ship and business creation are among the most important. Going beyond this, it is
often submitted that the university should be ‘entrepreneurial’
27. While not address-
ing this issue in detail here, we will make several remarks. 
First, if by being entrepreneurial it is meant that universities should be attuned to
their environment, both social and economic, and reactive to it, then we agree. But if
it means that universities should become very active agents in the market for ‘inno-
vation’ and that they should strive to obtain a significant amount of financing in this
way, then we are more reluctant. There may be better-designed institutions for this,
for example technological centres and technological parks located close to
universities (even with the participation of the latter in their management). Raising
money through direct entrepreneurial activities may be tempting (much of the need-
ed equipment and human resources being in place and, perhaps, paid for) but the
quantitative significance of these funds may easily be overestimated. The university
has a core mission that is not business. It is education and research that only
27.On this topic, see for example Clark, 1998, 2001.EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESGOVERNANCE
universities – and research centres – can accomplish: what is now commonly called
‘frontier research’. University research is heavily subsidised because it is, or it should
be, of the long-term, high-risk variety that could not be developed in the marketplace.
University research results cannot be reduced to a quarterly statement.  
That said, the following two caveats are evident. First, universities should protect the
intellectual property (IP) they generate (and share it with their researchers). It is
also sensible that they dedicate efforts to gain financially from it. Even more, they
should have an obligation to make it available for exploitation (in exchange for com-
pensation, of course). Traditionally, universities have not been very good at all this:
witness the massive relinquishing of potential IP that the publication of university
research in outside journals represents. Second, the best way for a research
university to foster competitiveness and growth is by being very good at its core mis-
sion. That is, by being, so to speak, a showcase of cutting-edge techniques and ideas,
by generating frontier ideas and by having, in or in the vicinity of the university prem-
ises, human talent that is entrepreneurial enough to perceive the possibilities of mar-
ket exploitation, and willing enough to take risks to that end.
406. Faculty and careers
From the quantitative point of view, present faculty numbers at European
universities are adequate for current needs. The student/teacher ratio of around 16
is reasonable, although it is not evenly distributed across countries. Expansion of the
student population will necessarily require more faculty. As for faculty demographics,
the age distribution of university teaching staff in Europe shows an average age of
around 44 years
28.
Figure 4: age distribution of academic personnel in the European Union
Source: OECD
Where is Europe to find the additional teaching staff needed to fill gaps left by natural
wastage and to provide for the increase in faculty numbers? There are two sources.
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28.OECD, Education at a Glance, 2007. This graph combines data for 18 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
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First, the internal European production of PhDs. In 2005, Europe produced a total of
96,000 PhDs and the total stock of PhDs in Europe was approximately 1.5 million
29.
Figures 5 and 6 show the total production and employment of PhDs.
In 2005, there were 65,299 non-European students seeking a PhD in Europe
30. It
appears, therefore, that if all non-Europeans granted their PhDs in Europe were to
remain in Europe and the brain-drain effect were to be contained or even reversed –
and assuming industry did not absorb a higher proportion of PhDs than at present –
Europe would be on the right replacement track. It is to be expected, however, and it
is desirable, that there will be a process of concentration in the production of PhDs.
The second source is the import of PhDs qualifying outside Europe. This is an appro-
priate option and Europe certainly should not limit in any way the possibility for high-
ly skilled professionals to come to Europe in response to incentives, to the desire for
a better life or to pursue professional challenges. That said, it is clearly beneficial for
less-developed countries to retain local talent to a greater extent than currently.
Development funding might even be directed towards policies designed to provide
incentives for high-skilled personnel to return, remain or relocate in the less-devel-
oped world.
We could also look at mobility within Europe.  We should, first of all, emphasise that it
is imperative to free the European academic world of the still-too-numerous barriers
to mobility, from manifestations of petty protectionism in the area of degree recogni-
tion to the limits on the portability of pension rights. Yet a note of caution is needed
here. The success of an ESHE cannot be tested and judged simply by the attainment
in every institution of a full mix of nationals and non-nationals (for both teaching
staff and graduate students). This would be too mechanical. Europe is culturally more
diverse than the US (think of languages!). Nor is it to be expected that the impact of
implementing ESHE would be a rate of concentration such as we find in the US. What
is essential is that there should not be any obstacle to mobility. But if the outcome of
the free operation of the ESHE is that a high percentage of researchers who are
nationals of a given country end up in that same country, this result would not in
itself be negative. To repeat, it all depends on how the result is achieved. People may
opt to live near family if this is what they prefer. There is no clear evidence that the
effect of such preferences necessarily hampers the long-run welfare of the citizens of
Europe. Consider the following transitional ‘paradox’ (we made a similar point for
29.Source: Eurostat. Data for EU27.
30.Source: Eurostat.
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Figure 5: PhD production in Europe in 2005
Source: Eurostat
Figure 6: Employed PhDs in Europe
Source: Eurostat (2005)
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undergraduate students in Section II): suppose that a country has a very closed
system of recruitment of university faculty but a large contingent of researchers
working abroad, perhaps because they were trained there. If this country were sud-
denly to throw open recruitment, many of its researchers might return. The paradox
is that this positive development would have a negative impact on the mix statistics.
Some countries will lose international faculty if staff return to their country of origin. 
Figure 7: ISCED 6 students trained in Europe that are non-European
Source: Eurostat (2005).
It is self-evident that the human resources dimension of a policy of excellence in
higher education is crucial
31. There is little point, for example, in spending consider-
able amounts of money installing cutting-edge facilities if insufficient care is taken in
selecting those who are to use the facilities. This question involves examining remu-
neration levels. Traditionally, Europe has undervalued this aspect of academic compe-
tition for the recruitment, retention and recovery of top talent. Indeed, salaries have
traditionally not even been viewed as currency in the competition for talent. This atti-
tude is not completely without foundation. To a certain extent university faculty and
researchers trade off higher remuneration against a freer and less directed working
environment than that prevailing in a typical private firm (Aghion, Dewatripont, Stein,
2006). But this observation should not be overstated, especially if international aca-
demic competition were to lead to higher pay and even more freedom.
0
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31.For a detailed comparative study of hiring practices for faculty in France, Germany and the US, see Musselin,
2005.
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Salary structures for university teaching staff are not uniform across Europe. Non-
uniformity is unavoidable and, in itself, not objectionable. What is important, we
believe, is for university institutions and research centres to have the ability to set
their own salaries and to design a competitive policy that includes, in recruitment
matters, the remuneration dimension. Nonetheless, there are some important ques-
tions in this regard.
First, European countries currently have different levels of GNP per capita. Where two
countries of a similar per capita income choose to have different salary structures for
faculty and researchers, this is clearly unobjectionable. However, a relatively poor
country is unlikely to be able to compete with the institutions of a relatively rich
country on a level playing field. 
Second, European higher education institutions tend to exhibit an egalitarian bias in
salary matters, either because of deeply ingrained notions of fairness or because of
the constraints imposed by the nature of governance structures, often based on
self–management. It may not be straightforward for universities to switch to levels
of remuneration that are perceived as being ‘very high’. An additional complicating
factor is that, in many European countries, university teachers and researchers are
civil servants, which makes it difficult to operate salary flexibility (and, in some
cases, to hire foreign citizens).
Third, the possibility for high-level remuneration is often limited simply because
funding is ‘soft’, ie it derives from programmes, typically public, with a limited lifes-
pan (rarely more than five years: the case of the recent Excellence Initiative in
Germany
32).  Such initiatives are certainly helpful, but not sufficiently so. It will be
difficult to attract to Europe somebody with tenure at a solid university in the US if
his/her salary is guaranteed for only five years, even if tenure is guaranteed.
32.Quoting directly from the explanatory website on the German initiative: ‘Plans include the establishment of
approximately 40 graduate schools, each to receive an average of €1 million annually, and approximately 30
clusters of excellence, which will each receive an average of €6.5 million annually’: http://www.dfg.de/
en/research_funding/coordinated_programmes/excellence_initiative/general_information.html.7. Recommendations
We have argued that in the current era of knowledge-intensive growth it is crucial for
Europe to foster the emergence of world-class universities, while maintaining its
good average higher-education level. Achieving this twin objective of excellence and
equity requires in turn action along three dimensions: (i) financing; (ii) autonomy
and governance; and (iii) competition and mobility. This calls for action by both EU
member states (and their regions) and the European Union itself.
We are well aware that advocating a combination of more money, more autonomy
and more accountability is not new. It is, for example, broadly in line with the analy-
sis of the European Commission (2006b). However, turning these three general prin-
ciples into precise recommendations requires having a clear picture about the reality
of higher education in Europe and its member states (and regions). Existing statis-
tics are useful but insufficient in this respect. One contribution of this Blueprint is to
present new evidence collected from a sample of top European research universities,
pertaining to their size, funding and governance. It would be very useful if this kind of
effort were undertaken systematically by (European and national) statistical
authorities. 
7.1 Financing
The level of funding
Europe suffers from a ‘double deficit’ in higher education and research in comparison
with the United States: as a percentage of GDP, there is the much talked-about deficit
in terms of research funding, but there is also a sizable deficit in terms of higher
education funding. The level of funding of European universities varies across
countries but, on average, it is insufficient for a satisfactory discharge of its teaching
and research missions. This, plus a strong egalitarian bias in public funding, has
made the development of elite research institutions very difficult.
It is to be noted that the expected expansion of the student population at the under-47
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graduate level and the unsatisfactory state of teaching facilities and equipment at
many universities (with considerable variation across countries) make a substantial
increase of funding at that level inevitable (again, with variations across countries).
To this we should add the financial challenges of graduate education. 
A reasonable target of reform would be to increase, over a period of 10 years, annual
expenditure on higher education by a full one percent of European GDP. Admittedly,
we only mean here to provide a rough order of magnitude, in the same spirit as the
‘Lisbon three percent’ target. Note that this target would only close half the current
gap between the EU and US status quo (1.3 percent versus 3.3 percent of GDP spent
on higher education). Stressing a one percent target may help focus attention on the
task before us.  
Where should this increased funding come from? Note that, just as the ‘research
deficit’ originates in lower private funding in Europe as compared to the US, the same
is true for the ‘higher education deficit’. Indeed, American universities benefit from
higher fees and also higher donations than their European counterparts. 
We remain agnostic as to whether public or private money should be used to close
the gap between European and American university budgets. But we stress two key
ideas: (i) it is crucial for Europe that this gap gradually be closed; and (ii) this should
be done while fostering equality of opportunity in terms of university access. We dis-
cuss in turn various possible sources of university funding.
We also point out that not all the increased revenue should go to institutions. In order
to increase the quality of education, scholarships to students allowing them to
devote themselves full-time to their studies are also very valuable.
Fees and student aid
We have repeatedly drawn a distinction between the Bachelor level, where a policy of
fees below cost is defensible and, in our view, reasonable, and the postgraduate
Master level, which should, ideally, be less regulated and where in all probability a
variety of acceptable models will emerge, some including subsidies and some more
self-sufficient. 
We should emphasise, however, that if the graduate level evolves in such a way as to
generate a structure of fees aligned with cost, then it is indispensable that this be
backed up by a vigorous policy of scholarships for reasons of merit, of need or of theEUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESRECOMMENDATIONS
nature of the particular studies (for example, PhD studies). In fact, both political
expediency and funding needs imply that part of the increased revenues that higher
education institutions may derive from a policy of liberalised fees be devoted to
scholarships. 
More generally, we believe that any hope of success for any well designed and ambi-
tious initiative for the funding of higher education and research rests on its being
accompanied by a powerful policy of scholarships, loans and income-contingent
repayment schemes
33. 
Note also that, in systems where (direct and indirect) fees become substantial, it is
important to guard against the natural tendency of universities to start ‘targeting’
richer students. The most famous case in this respect is that of the Ivy League ‘lega-
cy students’ in the US, where preferential treatment is given to students who are chil-
dren of big donors. Such discrimination based on parental income is, of course, high-
ly objectionable. It means that, in systems where students and their family con-
tribute a sizeable portion of university budgets, admission policies ought to be based
on centralised meritocratic indicators rather than left to the discretion of individual
universities.
Concerning Doctoral education, essential to the vigour of European science, the US
example is clear enough: good PhD training is very expensive. Thus, in contrast to
most European universities, the major PhD-granting universities in the US devote a
very large slice of faculty resources to the task. We believe that this economic con-
sideration is by far the primary issue for European Doctoral education.  The conclu-
sion is inescapable: Doctoral training should be a central focus for the channelling of
new public resources directed towards higher education, and the indispensable criti-
cal mass will only be reached if these new resources are targeted very selectively
(as, for example, has been done recently in Germany with the Excellence Initiative).
Private funding
Unleashing the generosity of private donors (individuals, firms or foundations) would
constitute a dramatic change for the funding underpinnings of European higher
education and research. Tax incentives should play a role here and, in particular, we
would advise that countries adopt appropriate legislation. But the main limitation is
still cultural, which is both bad and good news: bad, because cultural change is
33.See Barr, Crawford, 2005, Vandenberghe and Debande, 2006.
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difficult to engineer and good, because cultures do change. In this respect we would
like to think that the time is ripe for a change and the only piece of advice we can give
is: do not hesitate to celebrate those that give. 
Endowments
The autonomy, responsibility and quality of decision-making of universities, research
centres or graduate schools would be much helped if these institutions had endow-
ments, not merely physical but also financial. Obviously we cannot pretend, or hope,
that in the foreseeable future all European universities will possess endowments
capable of sustaining them with their return
34. But even if, on average, endowments
were to generate revenue of the order of five percent of universities’ budgets, this
would be very significant and it would have much added value, in the currency of
quality of decision- making, beyond the monetary return.
Endowing institutions with this capability would represent a one-shot commitment
of approximately one percent of European GDP. This is certainly significant and not all
countries will be in a position fiscally to undertake an injection of this type. But in the
end it is a question of priority. The idea, incidentally, is not new. In 2007, the
Australian government established a Higher Education Endowment Fund (HEEF) that
does exactly what we suggest
35.
Incentives
In matters of funding incentive effects are of paramount importance. Beyond the
cost- covering aspects one should also consider the consequences that different
types of funding induce on the effort and the commitment of universities to research.
This means that public funding rules should be transparent and stable over time. In
particular, they should not penalise success. In fact, the opposite should prevail: they
should reward it. This is currently not always the case. University officers sometime
live in fear that success in private fund-raising will lead to ‘compensatory’ decreases
(or unexpectedly low increases) in public funding. This tendency should clearly be
avoided.
34.For an interesting discussion of the role of endowments in US universities, see Hansmann, 1990.
35.See Australian Government, 2007.EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESRECOMMENDATIONS
7.2 Autonomy and governance
Increased funding must go hand-in-hand with reform of autonomy and governance.
Autonomy
The degree of autonomy of universities from public authorities should be, on average,
considerably higher than what it is at present. It is true that there are restrictions on
student access and fees (especially at the first degree level) that may be appropri-
ate and that certainly limit the scope of autonomy. It is legitimate for public
authorities to impose a number of public policy objectives on universities in compen-
sation for the funding they award them. This applies also to the structure of curricu-
la (sometimes derived from international agreements) that need to be accepted. But
beyond this we think that the ESHE will be better and more vibrant if it is open to the
free play and interaction of self-set strategies on the part of universities.
To be more concrete, we propose that every university in Europe should be
autonomous, in the sense of having legal standing, owning assets, having the capac-
ity to contract, to hire staff and set their pay, and freedom to set budgets and devel-
op policies of every kind. Ideally, universities – or, for that matter, research centres –
should be endowed with (i) a board which decides policy; (ii) an efficient and profes-
sional management structure (the best use of faculty resources is not in
management); and (iii) internal participatory mechanisms. 
(Self-)governance
Self-governance is a different issue than autonomy. A university can be viewed as
self-governed if its board, or a good part of it, emerges from an internal election
process involving the different components of the university community, in varying
proportions. And, especially, if the main authority of the university – president, rec-
tor, vice-chancellor – also emerges from such a process.  University autonomy is nei-
ther implied by, nor implies, self-government. A university can have very little auton-
omy if its head, endowed with little real authority and chiefly representative status, is
internally elected. Conversely, a university can be very autonomous if it has a board
that selects the main authority (not necessarily from within the university) through
an external, political process.
We put forward three observations:
5051
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1. Entirely internal selection of the main authority should be avoided. It makes gov-
ernance excessively biased in favour of the interests of current constituents. As a
result, it becomes difficult, or even impossible, to make choices or steer policies
that are viewed as inimical to powerful internal groups. For example, if the
university can fix its salaries it is likely that the scales will be too flat and not con-
ducive enough to a competitive recruitment policy outside the institution. Or if the
university can hire its faculty it may be difficult to prevent the existence of small
and low-quality Doctoral programmes that subsist only because of a self-
generated, endogamic demand.
2. To the extent that the board is appointed through a (political) process external to
the university it is important that the appointment mechanism fosters independ-
ence and expertise.
3. If the main authority is selected (from inside or outside the university) by a board
appointed through an external process, the views of internal constituencies, and
especially those of long-term employees, should be taken into account on impor-
tant matters.
One sensible possibility would consist of (i) an externally appointed, independent
board, including some internal representation, which should not dominate, and (ii)
for the selection of the main authority, the board should organise a search that leads
to a proposal that must be approved by an internal senate. This approach, or varia-
tions thereof, constitutes in our view a good balance between the need to ensure
good leadership on one hand and good cohesion and collegiality, which are indispen-
sable components for a smooth-running university community, especially for those
enjoying a good degree of autonomy.  
External influence on the board is of course not a panacea. In particular, the process
by which external members are appointed may have flaws: can we trust those public
authorities which design suboptimal rules for their university systems to appoint the
right people onto university boards? While this is not guaranteed, we observe that
the countries that have gone for significant external influence on university boards
(Nordic countries, UK, Ireland or Netherlands, see Table 5) are countries which do well
in terms of research performance. Effective boards represent one dimension through
which universities compete, and we expect the discipline of competition to ensure
that a significant number of European universities will finally have professional
boards.EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESRECOMMENDATIONS
7.3 Competition and mobility: the role of Europe
The main force that can trigger the development and maintenance of peaks of excel-
lence in the European landscape of higher education is, it seems to us, the will and
the ability of their (autonomous) institutions operating in a competitive field for stu-
dents, faculty and (research) funding. Higher education is and should remain a
responsibility of member states (or their regions), but Europe can and should help,
beyond doing what it already does, in ensuring greater mobility and therefore more
vigorous competition. We discuss in turn students, faculty members and university
budgets.
Competition for students
We stressed the beneficial role that the Bologna process is playing in fostering com-
petition at the Master level. This could be enhanced by the introduction of a
‘Standardised European Test’ (SET), which could follow similar principles as the
Graduate Record Examination (GRE) in the United States. Such a test could be useful
in particular in making more ‘objective’ the admission requirements at the Master
level. Indeed, one can predict that fees will probably rise in various countries for such
programmes, if only because of the peculiarity of a European system which com-
bines uniform fees for all EU citizens without generalised transferability of education
subsidies across countries (or even regions, in some cases). Since one can expect
cross-country mobility to be substantial at the Master level, raising fees may be the
only way to avoid subsidising foreign students. There will then be a temptation for
universities to discriminate in favour of more ‘remunerative’ students. Standardised
tests can help combat this danger and ensure access based on academic merit.   
Competition for faculty
Autonomy, both in terms of recruiting and in terms of wage-setting, is crucial to fos-
tering competition for top faculty. Further measures can be decisive too. For example,
ensuring the mobility of scientists, through the portability of pension rights, would be
a very welcome step. More generally, policies towards the ‘recruiting, retaining and
recovering’ of talent are a dimension where public policy, at the member state and EU
level, may be decisive in asserting the competitiveness of European academia in the
global world. Even further, partnership between universities (or research centres),
the public sector and the private sector (business or foundations), may be especial-
ly useful in this area, since it may allow the funding of permanent and competitive
compensation packages, which should be awarded through open tender and after
5253
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strict evaluation. It is fundamental that these programmes be excellence-based. We
suggest going beyond current practice on two main grounds: (i) the long-term char-
acter of the grants and (ii) the possible participation of the private sector.
Fostering competition: the ‘no-endogamy principle’
To facilitate mobility, but also the strengthening of PhD-granting institutions, we
believe that it would be healthy if European universities were to endorse a no-
endogamy principle for faculty recruitment. That is, a commitment of institutions pro-
ducing PhDs not to provide the firstemployment of their awardees (or, more general-
ly, not to consider in any way their own awardees for an employment contract for a
period of, say, three years after the granting of the title). The advantages of adopting
this principle go beyond the obvious ones (cross-breeding). The principle is also very
helpful from the standpoint of providing good incentives for quality and critical mass,
since it makes it impossible for Doctoral programmes to generate their own demand.
It should be emphasised that our suggestion only concerns employment just after
the PhD.
Competition for research funds
To foster research excellence, it is of crucial importance that significant research
funds – for individuals, research centres and departments – be allocated competi-
tively at all levels: member states, regions and the European Union (grants by the EU
should be free, if possible, of compensatory – network-like – arrangements). In par-
ticular, we believe that institutions (universities or research centres) should not be
provided with basic financing that includes all the research funding they need. A sub-
stantial part of funding should be obtained as a collateral result of their ability to
attract competitive grants. 
A mechanism to accomplish this is the use of overheads
36. Individual researchers
tend not to like these because they resemble taxation. But overheads are very impor-
tant. No only for the purpose of paying maintenance costs, but also because they
provide incentives to universities (and/or research centres) to obtain research
grants and, therefore, to develop the right policies (on faculty hiring, etc) to obtain
them in sufficient volume.
36.Contracts and grants for university-administered research funding should include not only the direct costs of the
project, but also a range of indirect costs, such as infrastructure. Universities should be able to recover these
costs in the form of overhead charges typically calculated as a percentage of the direct costs.EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIESRECOMMENDATIONS
In order to achieve greater efficiency in the allocation of research funding, it is prob-
ably desirable to raise the amount of resources awarded through EU-wide competi-
tion. In this respect, an important step has been the creation of the ERC (European
Research Council), the first EU programme to fund ‘bottom-up research’ (as opposed
to thematic research geared towards ‘European competitiveness’ or mobility and net-
work programmes) which promotes competition at EU level, emulating in this sense
the US National Science Foundation and National Institutes of Health. The ERC has a
budget of around €1 billion per year in the 2007-2013 period. This remains modest
in comparison with the NSF (around $6 billion per year) and especially the NIH
(around $30 billion per year). Of course, in Europe, member states themselves
account for the bulk of public research funding, which totals around €100 billion per
year. Given the relative underfunding of higher education in Europe, national and
regional funding should not be reduced. But there is a clear need to increase the EU
budget for university research and to allocate it on the basis of excellence on the ERC
model.
It is likely that the need to compete for research grants, as well as for students and
faculty, will induce specialisation and it is not impossible that many universities will
end up being excellent at something. The ‘excellent’ universities will then be those
that manage to be excellent at many things. By definition, there will not be many of
those. 
Completing the people policies: graduate fellowships
The development of a vibrant European space of graduate education would be much
helped by closing a gap in the ‘people’ policies of the EU. There are now in place excel-
lent European mobility programmes at the undergraduate level (Erasmus), at the
advanced Doctoral and initial post-Doctoral phase (Marie Curie), at the more
advanced post-Doctoral start of a career phase (ERC junior grants), and so on. 
But there is no significant programme for the initial graduate phase (leading to
research Masters or the PhD). This is a pity. A programme focusing on that segment
could provide a good stimulus for the development of strong graduate schools
endowed with a drive for excellence. The US experience in this respect is very posi-
tive. There, the prestigious Graduate Research Fellowship (GRF) Program of the
National Science Foundation (NSF) fulfils the required role. To quote from its state-
ment of purpose: ‘The NSF aims to insure the vitality of the human resource base of
science, technology, engineering and mathematics in the US and to reinforce its
diversity by offering approximately 1,000 graduate fellowships in this competition.
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The GRF provides three years of support for graduate study leading to research-based
Master or Doctoral degrees and is intended for students who are at the early stages
of their graduate study.’
The Fellowship pays around €30,000 per year per student (including tuition fees),
which means €90,000 for three years. In the European case the graduate schools
should probably also receive compensation aligned with cost. Hence the global dis-
bursement may be around €120 million per year for 1,000 students (€90 million for
students and €30 million for universities). 
From people to institutions: a funding programme for graduate schools
In order to promote the development of graduate schools, and their launch on a sound
European basis, a possible scheme, inspired by some features of the recent
Excellence Initiative in Germany, could be developed along the following lines: in an
evaluation and selection process taking place in several waves, the EU would choose,
in a open and competitive manner, up to, say, 1,000 graduate schools
37. Each would
receive €1 million per year in European funding. The annual cost would therefore be
€1 billion per year.
Together, the two new EU-funded programmes - the graduate fellowships and the
graduate school - would cost €1.12 billion per year, or roughly one percent of the EU
budget.   
37.There are about 200 top universities in Europe and about 50 fields of research, which gives a maximum of 10,000
departments in the top universities. We assume that one in ten departments would be selected for funding of a
graduate school. Put it differently, for every research field, there would be 20 universities selected throughout
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